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ARTICLE 
THE VEIL OF FAIR REPRESENTATION: 
MAURICE CLARETT V. THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
By Brando Simeo Starkey 
I. INTRODUCTION 
He was ready. In 2004, the Ohio State Buckeyes running back, 
Maurice Clarett ("Clarett"), contested the National Football League's 
("NFL") Special Eligibility rule ("The Rule") mandating that all 
potential players must wait three years after their high school class has 
graduated to assume eligibility for the NFL Draft. l Clarett was only 
two years removed from his high school graduation. New York 
federal district court struck down The Rule, concluding that it violated 
federal antitrust law.2 The NFL appealed. 3 The Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, however, held that The Rule was not subject to federal 
antitrust laws but to federal labor laws and that The Rule complied 
with the latter.4 When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Clarett's 
dream of playing football on Sundays was deferred for a year.5 
In this paper, I contest that, although the Second Circuit correctly 
held that The Rule was subject to federal labor laws, the way in which 
those laws operate offends common sense. Moreover, the NFL and 
the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA"), if 
acting in the best interest of the league, should voluntarily abrogate 
The Rule. First, I will discuss Clarett's brief but impressive career as 
an Ohio State tailback. As a dynamic freshman, he led his school to 
an undefeated season and its first National Championship in thirty-six 
years. Second, I will analyze both the district court and appellate court 
decisions, highlighting the nuance that led the Second Circuit to 
overturn the lower court's findings. Third, I will call attention to the 
conspicuous and fundamental flaw in the manner in which federal 
labor laws operate. More specifically, I will challenge the paradoxical 
assertion that the NFLPA "has the ability to advantage certain 
l. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
2. Id. at 4~8. 
3. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
4. Id. at 135, 138. 
5. Id. at 130. 
17 
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categories of players over others" and can yet still somehow meet "the 
duty of fair representation."6 Fourth, using John Rawls' Veil of 
Ignorance, found in A Theory of Justice, I will introduce a 
philosophical framework by which sports players' associations can 
meet the necessary obligation of fair representation and conform to the 
way in which federal labor laws should operate. Fifth, this paper takes 
a turn, emerging from legal nebulousness, delving into NFL policy 
matters, knocking down the reasons for which the NFL and NFLPA 
proffer as a basis for the continuation of The Rule. Finally, I will 
argue why the NFL and the NFLPA should concentrate on the ability 
of the individual, not age, in determining readiness. 
II. TRIALS, TRIBULATIONS AND PRISON 
Clarett said, "[g]rowing up in Youngstown [Ohio], you don't have 
the best opportunities in the world, so you make the most of what you 
have."7 And so he did. Clarett, named the Offensive Player of the 
Year in America coming out of high school, graduated early with a 3.5 
GPA and a 1220 SAT score so that he could start as a freshman in 
Ohio State's backfield.s After starting the first game of the season, a 
victory, he impressed his coaches and teammates not only with his 
physical dominance, but his mental maturity . "You can tell Maurice is 
mentally prepared for the college game," freshman linebacker AJ. 
Hawk said. Hawk added, "[h]e seems to be a lot older than an 18-
year-old."9 Indeed, Clarett keenly understood the work ethic requisite 
for success. Furthermore, he had an appreciation for the cultural 
burdens that accompany socioeconomic ascendancy, commenting, 
"[I]f you lived in the hard environment of Youngstown, there is just 
some need that pushes you to get out, to get better and then to give 
back."ID It was the opinion of those around him that Clarett was a 
well-adjusted young man. II 
One would be remiss in overlooking Clarett's on-the-field prowess. 
His best game came against Washington State, the third game of the 
season, in which he amassed 230 yards and scored two rushing 
6. Id. at 139. 
7. Tim May, His Satisfaction Never Guaranteed; Maurice Clarett Constantly Pushes 
Himself to Do More, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 2002, at Dl [hereinafter His 
Satisfaction Never Guaranteed]. 
8. Tim May, OSU Football; Clarett Gets Head Start on Career at Ohio State, THE 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 13,2002, at D3. 
9. May, His Satisfaction Never Guaranteed, supra note 7. 
lO. Id. 
11. Id. 
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touchdowns. Although he did not have an impressive statistical output 
during the National Championship game against the vaunted and 
heavily favored Miami Hurricanes, he had two big plays that were 
instrumental in the Buckeyes' victory.12 
Clarett's sophomore season, however, was an unmitigated, public 
calamity. It started out promising with Clarett being mentioned as a 
Heisman trophy frontrunner. 13 It was downhill from there. In April of 
2003, Clarett's 2001 Chevrolet Monte Carlo was broken into. He filed 
a police report, claiming that over $6,000 worth of property was 
stolen. 14 After being prodded about the veracity of this claim, Clarett 
admitted that he had lied. 15 National Collegiate Athletic Association 
("NCAA") investigations ensued. 16 A war of words between Clarett 
and Ohio State followed. Ultimately, Clarett's football days at Ohio 
State were finished. 17 With seemingly no other alternative, Clarett 
decided to go professional but The Rule stood in his way. The courts 
were his only recourse. In September of 2003, Clarett announced his 
intention to sue the NFL. 18 
Clarett ultimately was drafted in the NFL. 19 In April of 2005, he 
was drafted by the Denver Broncos.2o Four months later, he was CUt.21 
After being cut, Clarett was arrested twice.22 His first arrest was 
concerning an alleged aggravated robbery of a brother and sister 
outside of a Columbus, Ohio nightclub.23 His second arrest was 
related to a concealed weapons charge after Clarett was pulled over, 
again in Columbus.24 At the time, Clarett was out on bond from his 
12 Tim May, A Peifect Ending; Buckeyes Once Again Come Up Big When It Counts, THE 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 4, 2003, at Sport 2. 
13. Tim May, Clarett Sees Quick Return; Ex-NFL Great Jim Brown on OSU Tailback's 
Team as 'Observer' in Process, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 12, 2003, at E1. 
14. Rob Oller, NCAA Eyes Clarett's Report of Theft; Electronics, Cash Stolen From Car 
OSU Tailback Was Driving This Spring, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 30, 2003, at E1 
[hereinafter Report of Theft]· 
15. Rob Oller, Eligibility Questions Send Clarett to Sidelines; Running Back Admits He 
Inflated Prices of Items Stolen from Car, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 31, 2003, at D 1 
16. Oller, Report of Theft, supra note 14. 
17. Rob Oller, Clarett Sues NFL to Turn Pro Next Year; Sophomore Can Preserve OSU 
Option if He Stays in School, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2003, at AI. 
18. Id. 
19. Bruce Cadwallader and John Frutty, Clarett Gets at Least 3lh years; Former OSU Star 
Settles All Cases Against Him by Agreeing to Plea Deal, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 
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previous arrest,25 and police noticed him driving erratically.26 When 
the police finally managed to pull Clarett over, he had an open bottle 
of vodka, an AK-47, thirty live rounds in the magazine, three pistols, a 
hatchet and was wearing a Kevlar bullet-proof vest. 27 In September of 
2006, Clarett pled guilty to both charges and will see freedom no 
sooner than three and a half years. 28 
III. THE CASE -- CLARETT V. NFL 
This section discusses Maurice Clarett v. National Football League 
at both the district court and appellate levels. The differing legal 
conclusions will be dissected, ending with an explanation of the 
Second Circuit's reasoning for overturning the lower court's ruling. 
A. The District Court Opinion 
On September 23,2003, Clarett filed suit against the NFL claiming 
antitrust injury. He was being denied the right to earn a living because 
of his age. 29 Both parties subsequently filed Motions for Summary 
Judgment. Clarett argued that The Rule violated antitrust law. The 
NFL claimed that Clarett "'lacked antitrust standing' and that, as a 
matter of law, the eligibility rules were immune from antitrust attack 
by virtue of the non-statutory labor exemption."30 
The district court had three arguments that led to the conclusion 
that Clarett had antitrust standing. First, the district court dismissed 
the NFL's position that antitrust laws were not controlling with respect 
to The Rule because it fell within a non-statutory labor exemption to 
antitrust law.3l The district court held following Mackey v. National 
Football League32 that antitrust law was applicable. 33 Under Mackey, 
eligibility rules "are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining," 
the rules "affect only 'complete strangers to the bargaining 
relationships," and the rules "were not shown to be the product of 
arm's-length negotiation."34 
25. Bruce Cadwallader, $6.1 Million Bond; New Charges Won't Delay Clarett's Trial, THE 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 11,2006, at El [hereinafter $6.1 Million Bond]. 
26. Cadwallader, At Least 3 V2 years, supra note 19. 
27. Cadwallader, $6.1 Million Bond, supra note 25. 
28. Cadwallader, At Least 3 V2 years, supra note 19. 
29. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382. 
30. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129. 
31. 1d. 
32. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
33. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129. 
34. 1d. 
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Second, the district court rejected the NFL's contention that Clarett 
did not show a satisfactory "antitrust injury" to have a cause of action 
and, even if The Rule was subject to federal antitrust law, Clarett was 
not injured by its presence.35 The district court held that the "inability 
to compete in the market," (the market being on the NFL playing 
field) was enough to establish an injury for antitrust purposes. 36 
Third, the district court concluded that the antitrust injury Clarett 
suffered, being disallowed from the NFL draft, was patent and the 
justifications for The Rule that the NFL proffered failed to mask its 
glaring anticompetitive nature. 37 The NFL argued that young players 
have an elevated susceptibility to both physical and mental dangers 
from which the NFL should protect them. 38 The Rule is designed to 
confront said dangers. With The Rule in place, the NFL is able to put 
forth a better product for public consumption than it could without The 
Rule.39 No one would, after all, want to spend their money on a 
sporting event full of young, often injured, immature players. As 
cogent as this justification may be, it was not adequate as a matter of 
law.40 The NFL could, furthermore, address these potential problems 
with other means that were not violative of antitrust law.41 With The 
Rule no longer in place, there was no impediment to Clarett being 
eligible for the NFL draft. On February 5, 2004, the court granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of Clarett.42 The district court entered an 
order stating Clarett was eligible43 and allowed him to enter the NFL 
draft. 
B. Overturned - The Second Circuit Opinion 
While the district court held that The Rule was subject to and 
antagonistic to antitrust law, the Second Circuit came to the opposite 
conclusion.44 The Second Circuit held that the "labor market for NFL 
players is organized around a collective bargaining relationship that is 
provided for and promoted by federal labor law, and that the NFL 
35. Id. 
36. Id. (quoting Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 403). 







44. Id. at 130. 
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clubs as a multi-employer bargaining unit"45 can get together "in 
setting the terms and conditions of players' employment and the rules 
of the sport without risking antitrust liability."46 In other words, while 
the district court held that antitrust law was applicable, the Second 
Circuit rejected that holding, concluding that the relationship between 
the NFL and NFLPA was subject to a non-statutory antitrust 
exemption and therefore governed by federal labor laws with which it 
complied.47 
The district court relied on Mackey in its conclusion that the NFL's 
eligibility rule did not meet one of the non-statutory exemptions to 
antitrust law.48 The Mackey factors, argued the Second Circuit, do not 
provide the "proper guideposts," when the challenge is that the 
eligibility rule is "an unreasonable restraint upon the market for 
player's services."49 Mackey guidelines should have been followed 
had Clarett argued "that the NFL's draft eligibility rules work to the 
disadvantage of the NFL's competitors in the market for professional 
football or in some manner protect the NFL's dominance in that 
market." 50 In short, the Clarett and Mackey decisions dealt with two 
separate legal questions. The district court erroneously conflated the 
two issues. 
The issues in Caldwell v. American Basketball Association, 
National Basketball Association v. Williams and Wood v. National 
Basketball Association5l are all analogous to Clarett's contention that 
the NFL was engaging in behavior tantamount to a "restraint upon the 
labor market for players' services and thus violated the antitrust laws . 
"52 
In all those cases, the Second Circuit held that the non-statutory 
labor exemption extinguished each player's claim. 53 The court's 
"analysis in each case was rooted in the observation that the 
relationships among the defendant sports leagues and their players 
45. Id. A bargaining unit. in this instance. is an entity comprised of different teams that come 
together to negotiate with the NFLP A. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 120 (citing Clarett. 306 F. Supp. 2d at 397). 
49. Clarett. 369 F.3d at 134. 
50. Id. 
51. Caldwell. 66 F.3d 523. 526-27 (2d Cir. 1995); Williams. 45 F.3d 684.687 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Wood. 809 F.2d 954.956-58 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting these cases all concern the legal issue 
of a plaintiff arguing against being restrained by a unionized labor market that has a 
collective bargaining agreement relationship with a multi-employer bargaining entity). 
52. Clarett. 369 F.3d at 135. 
53. Claret. 369 F.3d at 134-35. 
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were governed by collective bargaining agreements and thus were 
subject to carefully structured regimes established by federal labor 
laws."54 
After holding that The Rule was subject to federal labor laws and 
not antitrust laws, the issue before the court was then whether it was in 
compliance with the former. 55 The Second Circuit held the arguments 
to back Clarett's antitrust cause of action "run counter to each of these 
basic principles of federal labor law."56 First, because the NFL players 
are a union that decided to have the NFLPA as its bargaining 
representative, Clarett was forbidden by labor law from directly 
negotiating conditions of his employment with any NFL team.57 The 
terms and conditions of Clarett's employment with regard to the NFL 
must be determined by negotiations between the NFLPA and the 
NFL. 58 
Second, the NFLPA, as a player's union, possesses powers 
analogous to that of a legislative body insofar as it may restrict and 
create "the rights of those whom it represents."59 When searching for 
the most advantageous deal for NFL players, the representative can 
give preference to certain categories of players over others, which is 
subject to the representative's duty of fair representation.5O This ability 
to advantage certain categories of players over others is vested in the 
players' representative whenever "a mandatory collective bargaining 
relationship is established and continues throughout the relationship."61 
After a collective bargaining relationship commences, federal labor 
law then provides the legal fulcrum through which problems are 
settled.62 
Third, Clarett argues that because eligibility rules are not a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the "scheme established 
by federal labor law" can be avoided in favor of antitrust law.63 The 
54. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135 (noting that if there are exemptions to antitrust law, they are 
provided by statute. If a legal issue meets one of those statutory exemptions, antitrust law 
does not govern - federal labor law does). 
55. Id. at 136-37. 
56. Id. at 138. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 139. 
59. Id. at 139 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 
U.S. 426, 459 (1989». 
60. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967». 
61. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139 (quoting Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 528). 
62. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139 (citing Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529). 
63. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139. 
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district court agreed with this contention. 64 The Second Circuit 
rejected it, holding that eligibility rules are indeed a mandatory 
bargaining subject that has ramifications on the NFL players' working 
conditions and wages.65 Sports leagues are configured in such a way 
that although certain issues might not seemingly affect wages and 
working conditions, upon further reflection they actually do.66 The age 
at which players gain eligibility has countless ramifications on the 
competition of current players, salary caps, and salary pools for 
rookies. 67 
Additionally, Clarett argues that the eligibility rules are not 
permissible because they affect potential players that are not even 
members of the NFLPA.68 But within the confines of a collective 
bargaining relationship, the NFLP A and the NFL can decide that a 
player is ineligible as long as it does not violate federal laws 
prohibiting unfair labor practices or discrimination. 69 As discussed in 
Reliance Insurance v. National Labor Relations Board, an "[Employer 
is usually free to] pick and choose his employees and hire those he 
thinks will best serve his business interests."7o The Rule, it was held, 
was a lawful collective bargaining stipulation.71 
Clarett counters by noting that The Rule predates the collective 
bargaining agreement and the NFLP A and the NFL never bargained 
over it.72 In order to comply with federal labor law, The Rule had to 
have been bargained over.73 If it was not, it does not meet the non-
statutory exemptions to antitrust law. 74 The Second Circuit found this 
argument unpersuasive.75 "Given that the eligibility rules are a 
mandatory bargaining subject ... the union or the NFL could have 
forced the other to the bargaining table if either felt that a change was 
warranted."76 National Football League Management Council's 
("NFLMC") Vice President for Labor Relations, Peter Ruocco, claims 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 140. 
67. Id. (explaining that eligibility does indeed have huge ramifications on wages and working 
conditions) . 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at l4l. 
70. Id. at 141 (quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1969». 
71. Clarett, 369 F.3d at l4l. 
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that this is what actually transpired. 77 In conclusion, the collective 
bargaining agreement between the NFL and NFLP A is subject to 
federal labor laws and not antitrust laws. 78 The Rule conforms to the 
former. 79 
IV. THE FEDERAL LABOR LAW QUANDARY 
The tension between the district court and appellate decisions was 
whether or not antitrust law or federal labor law was controlling.8o The 
Second Circuit overruled the lower court, holding that federal labor 
law was controlling, and that The Rule was in compliance.8l Whether 
or not the Second Circuit solved the issue correctly in Clarett is not 
the issue with which this paper is concerned. For the purposes of this 
paper, it is assumed that the Second Circuit's resolution of the issue 
was correct. Indeed, it is conceded that the eligibility rule between the 
NFLP A and the NFL is governed by federal labor law not antitrust law 
and that federal labor law allows for a union to implement a rule that is 
tantamount to an age restriction. 82 The legal argument this paper 
attempts to make is that federal labor law allows representatives of a 
collective bargaining agreement to come to unjust age eligibility 
requirements. The Second Circuit did not get it wrong; federal labor 
law got it wrong. To argue this point, federal labor law needs 
exploration. 
As previously noted, the NFLPA is allowed to entrust a person with 
the power to act as a representative that bargains on behalf of players' 
rights. 83 The representative has "powers comparable to those 
possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of 
those whom it represents."84 "Congress gave to the ... representative 
the task of harmonizing and adjusting the conflicting interests of 
employees within the bargaining unit, no matter how diverse their 
skills, experience, age, race or economic level."85 Coming to a good 
agreement is, obviously, a very arduous task where there are members 
of the union that have disparate interests.86 Not everyone will arise 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 143. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 125. 
81. Id. at 143. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 139. 
84. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,202 (1944). 
85. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960. 
86. Id. 
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from the bargaining table completely satisfied; indeed total complete 
contentedness of all those represented is not a realistic occurrence.87 
The representative, however, has to meet the obvious standards of 
fair representation.88 That is to say, if the representative is not 
representing all of the employees "fairly," the standards of federal 
labor law are not met. 89 The definition of employee includes any 
employee, and is not constrained to the employees of a certain 
employer.90 Additionally, job applicants are "employees."91 There is a 
tripartite test when evaluating claims of unfair representation in 
collective bargaining agreements.92 "A breach of the statutory duty of 
fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a 
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, 
or in bad faith."93 
With respect to the arbitrariness of fair representation, it occurs 
"only if [the union's conduct] can be fairly characterized as so far 
outside a 'wide range of reasonableness' that it is wholly 'irrational' or 
'arbitrary.' "94 The sort of representation that constitutes "arbitrary" is 
purposefully broad.95 Indeed, "This 'wide range of reasonableness' 
gives the union room to make discretionary decisions and choices, 
even if those judgments are ultimately wrong."96 In Air Line Pilots 
Association v. O'Neill, for example, a settlement agreement was 
negotiated by the union with the employer, which hindsight showed to 
be a terrible deal for the employees.97 The union had negotiated a 
disastrous agreement for its workers. However, this was not enough to 
support a holding that the union's conduct was arbitrary.98 A union's 
conduct can be classified as arbitrary only when it is irrational, 
meaning when it is without a rational basis or explanation.99 
87. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). 
88. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177 (1967). 
89. Id. at 178. 
90. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(1), (3), 49 Stat. 452 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 152(1), (3) (1988». 
9l. Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959); John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483,485 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
92. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177. 
93. Id. 
94. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991) (quoting Huffman, 345 U.S. at 
338). 
95. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338. 
96. Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33,45-46 (1998). 
97. O'Neill, supra note 94, at 7l. 
98. Id. at 78-8l. 
99 Id. at 67. 
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If a union practices discrimination in its representation of 
employees the condition of fair representation is violated. loo In Steele 
v. Louisville & Railroad Co., for instance, the union and employer 
reached an agreement that discriminated against minority workers with 
respect to hiring and seniority rights. 10l Such a deal struck by the 
union was said to have been tainted because of its discriminatory 
character, failing to meet the duties of fair representation. lo2 
The third prong of this tripartite system for analyzing fair 
representation is bad faith. 103 Courts have held that bad faith "requires 
a showing of fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest action."104 Merely 
demonstrating that the Union did not represent an employee as 
vigorously as possible is insufficient to establish a violation. IDS Just 
merely showing bad faith is not enough for an employee to have a 
claim. Ackley v. Western Conference of Teamsters held that "to 
prevail on a fair representation claim, plaintiffs, in addition to 
establishing that a union acted unreasonably and in bad faith, must 
allege a causal connection between the union's wrongful conduct and 
the alleged injuries."lo6 There are, therefore, two parts. First, it must 
be proved that the union acted in bad faith.107 Second, it must be 
proved that whichever wrong that was initially proved caused the 
injuries in question. !Os 
The Second Circuit, in Clarett, held that the NFLPA can meet the 
duty of fair representation despite a stipulation in the collective 
bargaining agreement that disallows certain members because of their 
age. 109 As discussed supra, for the purposes of this paper, it is 
assumed that the Second Circuit resolved whether or not the necessity 
of fair representation was met correctly. That is, where a sports 
players' union decides that it is in the union's best interest to 
effectively agree to an age limit, they have not broken the duty of fair 
representation toward persons who actually have the talent to play at 
the level. It, however, should. 
100. Steele. 323 U.S. at 194-202. 
101. Id. 
102.Id. 
103. Vaca. 386 U.S. at 177. 
104. Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522,531 (lath Cir. 1992) (quoting Motor Coach 
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971). 
105. Mock, 971 F.2d at 53l. 
106. Ackley, 958 F.2d 1463, 1472 (9th Cir. 1992). 
107.Id. 
108.Id. 
109. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139. 
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Federal labor law should not allow a union to exclude workers who 
are clearly able to perform and still meet the requirement of "fair 
representation." There is nothing fair about a union that favors current 
players over future players to such an extent that it disallows future 
players' entry into employment with an arbitrary rule requiring players 
to wait three years after graduating from high school. 
V. REAL FAIRNESS 
The duty of fair representation is not met only "when a union's 
conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or in bad faith."llo Where in Clarett, a union, who 
represents both future players and current ones promotes the interests 
of one over the other to the degree that the NFLP A does, the duty of 
fair representation should not be met. III I reject the notion that a 
union, who represents future employees as well as current ones, can 
agree to a collective bargaining agreement that contains an age 
eligibility requirement and still meet the federal labor law duty of "fair 
representation." In all other respects, the tripartite system of 
discerning whether fair representation has been met makes for good 
policy. However, when it comes to eligibility rules, it is 
conspicuously unfair. The question then becomes as follows: What 
should constitute fair representation with respect to age limits when a 
union is negotiating a collective bargaining agreement? My 
contention is that the union should proceed under the veil of ignorance 
theory. 
A. Veil of Ignorance 
Under John Rawls' theory, the veil of ignorance,ll2 the rules of 
justice are chosen in the original position, behind a "veil of 
ignorance," that conceals facts from the parties about themselves 
(gender, age, race etc.) that would likely be used as attempts to tailor 
the rules to engender an advantage. 113 If behind the veil of ignorance 
we do not know our race, for instance, then we will not desire to 
implement rules that favor one race over the other. In the real world 
we know these key facts: "that in reasoning about justice we must 
disregard some of what we know ... pretend to ourselves that we don't 
110. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. 
Ill. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139. 
112. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1971). 
113. John Kilcullen, Rawls: The Original Position (1996), 
http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockhamly64Ll3.htm1(last visited Nov. 15,2006). 
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know it ... To ask what rules would people behind the veil of 
ignorance adopt is a way of asking what rules can be justified without 
reference to bargaining strengths and weaknesses."114 
The goal of the veil of ignorance is to put people in a position 
where they are likely to disavow their prejudices and set up rules that 
are the fairest possible. ll5 Under the veil of ignorance, one does not 
know his plight in life. Indeed, he knows nothing about himself. He 
does not know how the rules he chooses will affect his own 
situation. 116 People in the original position would adopt various 
positions and principles, but the pertinent principle is the second 
principle which is as follows: 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ... 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.l17 
B. Veil of Ignorance Applied to Facts 
The veil of ignorance is a philosophical theory about the world at 
large and needs to be adopted in the instant case. Therefore, the 
question is as follows: if one knew that he was a potential player and 
did not know his age, but that he could play in the NFL, what is the 
eligibility rule for which this person would advocate? 
In this position, the hypothetical person would advocate for open 
rules. That is, he would not favor any age restriction. He does not 
know his age and if he felt he could play football at nineteen-years-old 
he surely would not want an impediment standing in his way. It is 
foreseeable, for example, that someone has the talent to play in the 
NFL at age nineteen, but if there is a rule impeding this, he would 
have to wait, risking injury. Indeed, there are various scenarios that 
could result in a detriment to a player that does not meet a 
predetermined age standard. The answer is clear. Under the veil of 
ignorance, no one would argue for an eligibility requirement. 
The NFL might likely want to implement an eligibility impediment 
to stop young players from entering the league, but the NFLP A would 
at least have to challenge the NFL on that issue to meet the duty of fair 
114.Id. 
115.Id. 
116. Dennis C. Mueller. Defining Citizenship. 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 151. 156 (2002). 
117. Kilcullen. supra note 113. 
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representation. Here, the NFLP A did not even challenge the NFL on 
The Rule. Any union that fails to fight for inclusive measures, with 
respect to the age of employees, breaks the veil of ignorance and 
therefore should violate the duty of fair representation. 
VI. THE NFL'S ARGUMENTS 
Then Washington Redskins linebacker La V ar Arrington, voiced 
vehement disapproval regarding Clarett's potential presence on the 
professional football field. lIS He said that if he saw him on the football 
field, he would try to take his head off.119 His aggressive position 
towards Clarett was emblematic of an overreaching argument 
concerning young players in the NFL. They are not ready either 
mentally or physically, and to allow them on the football field with 
men is to render them susceptible to all types of peril. 120 To be an NFL 
player, you must be a man. A man, so the argument goes, has a 
certain type of body that can withstand the brutality that is 
professional football. Moreover, a man can deal with the turbulent, 
grueling nature of an NFL season, and the effects on the psyche, 
including the ability to deal with the media scrutiny and heightened 
public attention that accompanies an NFL contract. A boy cannot deal 
with this. In Clarett, the NFL stated that the first reason for The Rule 
was because it was in young football players' best interest to wait until 
they had matured before they entered the NFL. 121 
Columnist and ESPN personality Michael Wilbon agreed that 
Clarett was not ready for the NFL. 122 Wilbon concludes that there have 
only been three NFL players that could have played at an age at which 
The Rule forbids. 123 These three players are Herschel Walker (running 
back from University of Georgia), Bo Jackson (running back from 
Auburn University) and Marcus Dupree (running back from Oklahoma 
University).l24 Clarett is not ready for the NFL, he scribes, and will 
quickly find himself out of the league. If he were to stay in college, 
mature both physically and mentally, Clarett would be setting himself 
up in the best way possible for success at the next level. 125 
118. Michael Wilbon, For Clarett, It's a Bad Move, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at D 1. 
ll9.Id. 
120. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
121. Id. 
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Wilbon endorses The Rule stating that the NFL will be overrun 
with overly ambitious nineteen-year olds, destroying the high quality 
product that makes it undisputedly the most popular sport in 
America. 126 The NFL agreed, making this their second argument in 
buttressing the need for The Rule. 127 The Rule, the NFL maintained, 
safeguards the NFL from the potential disastrous byproduct associated 
with young players entering a league for which they are not physically 
or emotionally ready.128 
The NFL's final argument129 in support of The Rule was the 
league's desire to curb steroid use by young men hoping to one day 
become an NFL player. The Rule was "protecting from injury and 
self-abuse other adolescents who would over train- and use 
steroids-in the misguided hope of developing prematurely the 
strength and speed required to play in the NFL."130 It is an interesting 
argument, but one that essentially asks potentially qualified workers to 
give up millions of dollars so that high school adolescent boys are not 
tempted to engage in illegal and unethical behavior. 
The position that the NFL wants to discourage young men from 
taking steroids to enter the league is an honorable one. Steroid use 
among amateur athletes is of national concern. The NFL, however, is 
undeniably hypocritical on this issue. Eventually drafted in the first 
round of the 2005 NFL draft, Luis Castillo tested positive for a steroid 
at a pre-draft workout. l3l If the NFL's desire was truly to send a 
message that steroid use has no place in the NFL and, additionally, 
instill in amateur football players that steroids should not be taken 
under any circumstances, the NFL could have taken punitive measures 
against Castillo. But, they did not. Taking the NFL at their word, they 
let an opportunity to convey their altruistic intentions regarding 
amateur athletes and steroids slip by. He was drafted in the second 
round. 
Young players, quite simply are not ready, is the most deployed 
argument in support of The Rule from a policy standpoint. While it is 
true that most of the players The Rule excludes are likely not ready to 
126.Id. 
127.Id. 
128. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
129.Id. The third argument is excluded but it pertains to the NFL's desire to protect teams 
from the costs of young players that might potentially get injured because they were not 
physically ready to play. 
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make meaningful contributions to an NFL team, the NFL already has a 
natural and easy remedy to this potential disaster. They do not need to 
draft such players. A novel concept it seems to many of the NFL's 
decision makers, but it is unequivocally a perfect panacea. On draft 
day, had Clarett been eligible, any team viewing him as obviously too 
young would have had the option to pass on him. In order for young 
players to ruin the league, they first have to be in the league. The NFL 
conveniently overlooks their responsibility and posture insomuch as 
they are in a position to bottleneck the potential problem by not 
drafting players they conclude are not ready. 
One likely retort is that teams might be so tantalized by the talent of 
a nineteen-year-old sensation reminiscent of John Elwat32 that teams 
may draft him anyway, despite the fact that he is not mature enough to 
make a valuable contribution. Other teams might likewise be 
enamored with other prodigies. The fear, then, is that these players 
will not materialize and teams will be hurt by poor draft day decisions. 
If this happens, on a large scale, then naturally the NFL suffers. No 
one, after all, would want to watch the NFL if it were rife with young 
players that should actually be playing on Saturdays. 133 With the 
decreased interest, the NFL would be a less prosperous league. The 
NFL, therefore, would be smart to restrict the flow of players whose 
mere presence would attenuate the quality of the league. 
The peculiarity of this position, of course, is that teams currently 
get enamored by the talent of a twenty-two-year old sensation 
reminiscent of John Elway who is not mature enough to handle the 
NFL game. Joey Harrington, Akili Smith and Kyle Bollerl34 have 
analogous career trajectories because they were drafted early on full of 
promise. They all were unmitigated calamities. The NFL's response 
to these underperforming players was not to place a policy roadblock 
that impeded them in competing. The fear that teams have regarding 
players The Rule excludes are the same fears they have with the 
players The Rule includes. The solution is not to increase the age at 
which players become eligible, but to be more accurate in scouting 
college talent and predicting how that talent will project at the next 
level. The NFL's argument is essentially a save-ourselves-from-
132. John Elway is often esteemed as one of the best quarterbacks in NFL history. He was the 
number one draft pick in the 1983 NFL draft. 
133. College football is traditionally played on Saturdays. 
134. All three of these quarterbacks were drafted early in the first round of the NFL draft. 
None of them materialized. 
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ourselves position. The best way these teams can save themselves is 
to be smart in evaluating the talent and character of draft prospects. 
There are obvious strands of paternalism that are interwoven with 
the arguments given in support of The Rule. One might argue that 
these athletes should not be allowed to play until they reach a certain 
level of objective maturity. Coming out too early will ruin their 
careers. It is an undoubtedly a logical argument that, for most 
players, rings true. But should this be the NFL's decision to make? Is 
it a smart decision to allow the NFL to make a blanket rule that affects 
all players? 
No, the NFL should not stand in the way of individual choice, no 
matter how much they believe their opinion is right. People should be 
allowed to choose their own path in life. If they fail, if they did not do 
everything possible to succeed, the fault lies with them. In my 
opinion, America is very reticent to adopt a paternalistic orientation 
towards people's vocation. Indeed, setting race and class aside, 
America generally has egalitarian principles regarding employment. 
The NFL should align itself with this traditional American principle as 
opposed to adopting a policy that excludes even those players that are 
capable. 
VII. THE RULE HURTS THE NFL 
The NFL has already reached dominance in America. The next 
step is to market the league around the world. It is, however, an 
arduous task. The biggest obstacle the NFL has in selling its product 
to international consumers is that the NFL does not have star power. 
That is, without popular players to sell in foreign markets, the NFL 
will not have great success internationally. To be sure the NFL does 
have great players, the NFL just does not sell them to the extent that 
other leagues do. The NBA, for instance, is able to market its game 
around the world because they have actively sold their most prominent 
players. The NFL, conversely, sells teams. 135 The NBA, during the 
1992 Olympics in Barcelona, advanced the popularity of basketball 
greatly with The Dream Team. l36 Admittedly, American football is not 
an Olympic sport, so the NFL does not have that wonderful 
135. The saying is that the NFL sells the jerseys and the NBA sells the players. The saying 
stems from the diverging marketing strategies between the two leagnes. The NBA sells 
the fans their stars, and the NFL its teams. 
136. Jack McCallum, USA Inc. The High-flying Americans Are Also Scoring Big in the 
Marketing Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 1992 at 124. The Dream Team was the 
name given to the 1992 USA Men's Olympic team. 
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opportunity to sell its game in a global competition. The point, 
however, is that showcasing your players to the world is a requisite to 
expanding the game into foreign countries. 
The NFL has already begun the process of garnering more revenue 
internationally. The creation of NFL Europe was a big step in 
augmenting the popularity of the league in Europe. The NFL Europe 
is a developmental league for NFL teams. Teams send players to the 
league to gain experience. The NFL also played its first regular 
season game out of the country in 2005. 137 That contest, featuring the 
San Francisco 4gers and the Arizona Cardinals set the league's record 
for attendance at 103,467 in Mexico City's Azteca StadiumYs But, as 
ESPN's Len Pasquerelli notes, "the NFL still isn't as global a 
professional sports entity as, say, the NBA, and might never be."139 
Here is where The Rule comes in. People are fascinated with 
young athletes with impressive talent. It is compelling to see a 
nineteen-year-old kid compete against thirty-year-old men and excel. 
Few things in sports are as instinctively captivating. It is the Lebron 
James effect. 140 Young players are so hyped up that, before their first 
game, they are already marketable stars. Indeed, they are so 
marketable that people want to tune in just to see what the hype is 
about. With these, essentially ready made stars, the NFL increases its 
ability to sell its product overseas. The NFL is a few stars away from 
making a significant splash into the global market. 
The argument is not that, with The Rule abrogated, offshore 
markets will suddenly and miraculously open up. The argument is 
that, with a few of young prodigy-esque players, it will be easier to 
sell the game abroad. It is not the panacea to the problem, but having 
young stars in the NFL will help in advancing the game into other 
countries. It will also increase the NFL's popularity here, but the 
NFL's more imperative task in expanding is global. With a slight 
marketing shift, a shift that attempts to sell its players more, the NFL 
will make better headway into the global market. 
137. Len Pasquarelli, Hali Among Many African Born Players Drafted, Espn.com, May 5, 
2006, available at 
http://pwxy.espn.go.comlnfllcolumns/story?columnist=pasquarelli_len&id=2434221 (last 
visited Nov. 14,2006). 
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In addition to helping the NFL in a pecuniary capacity, gaining 
popularity in foreign countries also helps in procuring talent from 
other countries, increasing the league's talent pool. Also, it gives 
countries a player to root for which feeds back in to increasing the 
league's popularity around the world. Currently, the overwhelming 
majority of players come from America. The league does have players 
coming from a wide range of countries, particularly those in Africa 
and the American Samoa. 141 To be sure, there have been recent strides 
in the ethnic diversification of NFL players, but with increased 
popularity abroad, those strides can be dwarfed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The duty of fair representation mandated by federal labor laws with 
regards to age eligibility does not operate in any fashion consistent 
with the word fair. A union arguing on behalf of employees should 
have to advocate against an eligibility requirement if it wants to meet 
the requirement of fair representation. It cannot, as here, acquiesce. 
Such a union stance would violate the theoretical principles of the veil 
of ignorance - a theory adopted142 to arrive at a true sense of fairness 
and justice. Moreover, the NFL proffers flawed policy arguments in 
favor of The Rule. Indeed, each and every reason the NFL gives for 
maintaining The Rule is fundamentally flawed. Finally, the NFL does 
itself a disservice by not abating their age restriction. Without The 
Rule, the NFL will place itself in a better position to garner 
international popularity, a paramount concern for the league. 
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